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Humans are strongly influenced by their environment, a dependence that can lead to errors in judgment. Although a rich literature
describes how people are influenced by others, little is known regarding the factors that predict subsequent rectification of misleading
influence. Using a mediation model in combination with brain imaging, we propose a model for the correction of misinformation.
Specifically, our data suggest that amygdalamodulationof hippocampalmnemonic representations, during the timeofmisleading social
influence, isassociatedwithreducedsubsequentanterior–lateralprefrontal cortexactivity that reflectscorrection.These findings illuminate the
process bywhich erroneous beliefs are, or fail to be, rectified and highlight howpast influence constrains subsequent correction.
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Introduction
From early infancy, we look to others as a primary source of
information about the world. This reliance is so powerful that we
often reevaluate our ownperceptions, preferences, andmemories
when they contradict a larger consensus (Sherif, 1936;Meade and
Roediger, 2002; Hirst and Echterhoff, 2012; Lewandowsky et al.,
2012). Although this strategy can often be adaptive in maximiz-
ing accuracy, because other members of the group may have
more accurate knowledge than the individual (Deutsch and Ge-
rard, 1955; Surowiecki, 2004; Schacter et al., 2011), such depen-
dence may carry a cost when relying on noncredible sources:
individuals with inaccurate information, poor skills, or people
who are intentionally lying. In such situations, it is adaptive to
surmount the misleading influence and maintain fidelity to the
original mnemonic representation (Byrne and Whiten, 1989;
Schiller et al., 2008; Schacter et al., 2011; Lewandowsky et al.,
2012; Engelmann and Hein, 2013).
This process, however, is not always successful (Ross et al.,
1975; Braun and Loftus, 1998; Meade and Roediger, 2002; Ech-
terhoff et al., 2005; Skurnik et al., 2005; Lewandowsky et al.,
2012). For example, eyewitnesses can often be influenced by
other witnesses, leading to a testimony that differs from their
original experience (Wright et al., 2009; Hirst and Echterhoff,
2012; Schacter and Loftus, 2013). If they subsequently discover
that the source they relied on had low credibility, they are not
always able to recover from such influence and reclaim their orig-
inal beliefs (Chambers and Zaragoza, 2001;Meade and Roediger,
2002; Echterhoff et al., 2005). Additionally, misinformation con-
veyed by medical professionals has been demonstrated to have
long-lasting effects on individuals, even after they are informed it
was mistaken (Lewandowsky et al., 2012). Certain forms of ad-
vertising (Braun and Loftus, 1998; Skurnik et al., 2005; Le-
wandowsky et al., 2012) and political propaganda have similar
effects (e.g., as in the case of the controversy over BarackObama’s
birthplace; Lewandowsky et al., 2012). How restoration from
misleading influence takes place in the brain and what are the
brain processes that restrict such recovery, evenwhen the original
source of influence is discredited, remain unanswered.
We posited that the ability to correct past influence depends
on brain processes occurring at two temporally distinct phases:
(1) the time of exposure to influence (initial influence strength)
and (2) the time influence is lifted. We have previously demon-
strated that amygdala activation during exposure to social infor-
mation and its enhanced functional connectivity with the
hippocampal-dependentmemory system reflect robust social in-
fluence (Edelson et al., 2011). Recovery from misleading social
influence can be taken as a powerful example of revision of for-
mer beliefs. Here, we first identified brain activity that is related
to correction when the source of the influence is discredited. We
then conducted a mediation analysis (Hayes, 2013) to test
whether and how this activity and correction success were mod-
ulated by past activity related to social influence.
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Materials andMethods
Participants. Fifty-nine right-handed participants (28 females, average
age 28.1  1.0 years) participated in the study. One participant was
excluded because of suspected minor brain pathology, one was excluded
because of head movements exceeding 4 mm, and one participant’s data
could not be acquired because of claustrophobia in the scanner setting.
Three additional participants were excluded from analysis because their
imaging data were not acquired (because of technical malfunction in the
scanner). Only subjects who indicated no suspicion of the experimental
manipulationwhendebriefedwere included in the analysis (finalN 40;
19 females, average age 27.8  1.1; 20 in the Social group and 20 in the
Computer group; groups are defined below). The percentage of suspect-
ing subjects was well within the norm for conformity studies (for a sum-
mary of suspicion in conformity studies see Stang, 1976; Ortmann and
Hertwig, 2002). All participants gave informed consent and were remu-
nerated for participation. The study was approved by the Institutional
Review Board of the Sourasky Medical Center, Tel-Aviv.
Stimuli.The stimuli consisted of a 40min eyewitness-styled documen-
tary following the activities of the police deporting undocumented im-
migrants. The film included scenes of forceful arrests of immigrants and
their families. The content was tested previously and had medium emo-
tional valence as rated by participants (51.2  2.3 on a 0–100 scale;
Edelson et al., 2011).
Procedure. The experiment was divided into four phases (encoding
followed by memory Tests 1–3) (see Fig. 1). Two groups (Social and
Computer) underwent a similar protocol that differed in the source of
the manipulation (in Test 2; see below).
Encoding phase (day 0). The initial encoding of the movie was per-
formed in groups of five unacquainted individuals (see Fig. 1A). The
participants were introduced to the group, and a photograph was taken
of each participant. The subjects were told that the experiment was test-
ingmemory and theywould subsequently be asked questions concerning
the content of the film. They were specifically instructed not to discuss
the film or memory tests with others at any stage.
Memory Test 1: initial memory, outside the scanner (day 3). Memory
Test 1 served to assess the participants’ baseline memory accuracy and
confidence before the manipulation and was comprised of a computer-
ized 400 question multiple-choice memory questionnaire on the film’s
content (see Fig. 1B). After selecting one of the two possible answers on
each question, the subjects rated how confident they were in their re-
sponses on a visual analog scale (VAS) ranging from 0 (guess) to 100
(absolute confidence) with 25 equating to low confidence, 50 tomedium
confidence, and 75 to high confidence. For the Social group, the average
accuracy in this test was 69.1 1.2% for all answers and 80.2 2.0% for
answers with medium to high confidence scores. For the Computer
group, the average accuracy was 67.0 1.9% for all answers and 82.3
4.1% for answers with medium to high confidence scores.
Memory Test 2: Manipulation phase, in the scanner (day 7). Here an
attempt was made to influence participants’ answers (see Fig. 1C).
Social manipulation group (Social group). Thirty participants (12 fe-
males, age 28.6 0.8) answered the samememory questions as in Test 1,
but this time before answering, they were presented with answers sup-
posedly given by their four fellow co-observers.On each trial, the pictures
of the co-observers were displayed together with their supposed answers
(mode of presentation adapted from Berns et al., 2005). The participants
then selected their answers and on 66% of the trials also provided a
confidence rating. Participants were instructed that the answers of their
co-observers could be used to assist their retrieval but that they ultimately
were required to answer according to their own recollection. To mini-
mize scanning time, only 320 questions were included in this test [i.e., 80
Credibility questions (see definition below) were randomly excluded].
The co-observer answers were pseudo-randomly allocated into three
different categories as follows (see Fig. 1C).
1. Manipulation condition. In a subset of trials, for which the partici-
pants originally had a confident veridical memory (as identified by Test
1), the answers provided by the four co-observers were all incorrect. For
each subject, questions that were answered correctly by that subject in
memory Test 1, with a confidence rating from 70% to 140% of his/her
average confidence rating, were identified. Eighty of these questions
(randomly assigned) were included as Manipulation questions in Test 2.
Average confidence rating for allManipulation questions was 62.6 2.3,
lying between a medium (50) and high (75) confidence rating.
2. No-Information condition. Twenty-five questions were randomly
chosen from the same pool of questions as in category 1 above (average
confidence rating 62.5  3.3). For these questions, the co-observers’
answers were not made available, and instead the letter X was displayed.
3. Credibility condition. A total of 215 different questions were ran-
domly chosen from all questions in memory Test 1. Because it is not
credible that all co-observers’ answers would be in disagreement with the
participant’s remembered view, it was necessary to add additional ques-
tions in which the co-observers’ answers supported the participant’s re-
membered view and confidence. The pattern of the falsified co-observer
answers in this condition depended on the subject’s answer and confi-
dence in memory Test 1, such that the greater the subject’s confidence in
his/her answer, the greater the number of conforming answers were
given by co-observers (i.e., between two and four co-observers’ answers
were in agreement with the subject’s answer in Test 1). Specifically, for
questions in which participants answered with low confidence in Test 1
(25 in VAS, see Fig. 1, confidence scale), two co-observers were in
agreement and two in disagreement with the participant’s original an-
swer, emphasizing the difficulty and uncertainty related to the specific
question. For answers with medium confidence ratings [between low
(25) and high (75)], three co-observers were in agreement and one in
disagreement with the participant’s original view, again strengthening
the participant’s original perspective. For answers with very high confi-
dence (75), all co-observers were in agreement with the participant’s
original answer. To further increase the protocol’s credibility and emu-
late natural human variability, 15% of Credibility questions received a
random answer pattern (i.e., regardless of the answer and confidence in
Test 1, between two and four co-observers’ answers were correct). The
Credibility questions always provided partial or full support for the par-
ticipant’s original answer, whereas in the Manipulation questions co-
observers’ answers were always in unanimous disagreement with the
participant’s original answer. Previous research into the phenomenon of
conformity and social influence demonstrated that the addition of even
one confederate supporting the subject’s view was sufficient to signifi-
cantly reduce social influence, and when half of the group supported the
subject’s answer, the affect was completely abolished (Allen, 1975; Asch,
1951). The average confidence for Credibility questions was 63.9 3.6,
which was not different from the confidence for Manipulation ques-
tions (62.6; t(38) 0.1, p 0.9).
Computer manipulation group (computer group). To compare recovery
from social and nonsocial influence, we performed a control fMRI ex-
periment using an inanimate medium to convey misinformation. In this
control, 29 participants (16 females, age 27.6  1.2 years; final N  20
after exclusion) underwent a protocol similar to that of the main exper-
iment. However, in theManipulation phase, instead of receiving answers
from co-observers, participants were told that the information origi-
nated from four different computer algorithms, a common technique
used to control for social effects (Berns et al., 2005; Klucharev et al.,
2009). Each computer algorithm was said to use a separate database of
documentary films and to provide the most probable answer according
to this database. The participants were told that the different algorithms
have been tested and provide an accuracy level similar to that of humans.
The average confidence rating was 60.0  2.6 and 62.5  2.5 for the
Manipulation and No-Information conditions, respectively.
Memory Test 3: correction phase; in the scanner (day 14). To examine
the neural and computational processes underlying recovery from social
influence, participants were informed that the answers given by the co-
observers/computers during the previous session were actually deter-
mined randomly (see Fig. 1D). This rendered these answers as
“uninformative.” The participants were then requested to complete the
memory test again (Test 3) based on their original memory of themovie.
The scan was divided into three sessions with a 15 min break between
sessions. On each trial, the question was presented along with two possi-
ble answers for 1.5 s. The participants were not allowed to answer during
this period to ensure that they read the question and answers fully. After
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the 1.5 s interval, the color of the question font changed, indicating to the
subjects that they could now respond. Participants then provided a re-
sponse. This was followed by a fixation cross for a jittered time interval (3
s average). On 66% of the trials, the participants also provided their
confidence rating. In these cases, an additional jittered fixation was in-
troduced between the participants’ response and confidence rating (2 s
average).
Debriefing. After conclusion of the four phases of the experiment,
participants were interviewed using a questionnaire in which they were
askedwhether in any stage of theManipulation phase they suspected that
the answers provided to them did not originate from the co-observers/
computers. In accordance with previous work in experimental psy-
chology, data from participants who suspected the nature of the
manipulation were analyzed separately (Stang, 1976; Ortmann and
Hertwig, 2002). Two questions were defined as predetermined criteria to
determine suspicion. The questions were as follows: (1) Did you suspect
a manipulation at any stage of Test 2? If so, at what stage? Excluding
answer: Yes (regardless of the stage). (2) Did you think the answers of
your fellow group members were fictitious? If so, how strong was your
suspicion? Excluding answer: Yes (regardless of the strength of suspi-
cion). All subjects that gave a positive answer indicating suspicion on one
of the questions also answered positively, indicating suspicion on the
other question. These subjects reported a gradual acquisition of suspi-
cion over the test period. Thus, suspicious subjects were a heterogeneous
group comprised of subjects that suspected the manipulation at various
stages of the test and with varying degrees of suspicion. To avoid Type 1
errors and confounds related to uncovering the manipulation at various
stages during the imaging session, we separately analyzed all suspecting
subjects. Eight subjects in the Social group and five subjects in the Com-
puter group were suspicious. A wealth of psychological literature dem-
onstrates this number is well within the norm for conformity studies (for
summary of suspicion in conformity studies see Stang, 1976; Ortmann
and Hertwig, 2002). Behavioral and imaging analysis confirmed that
suspecting subjects indeed differed from nonsuspecting subjects.
Whereasmemory performance in Test 1, beforemanipulationwas intro-
duced, did not differ between suspecting and nonsuspecting subjects for
either the Social group or Computer group (p  0.2), in Test 2 (when
manipulation was introduced) suspecting subjects had significantly
fewer errors on Manipulation trials (Social group: 48.6  4.5%; Com-
puter group: 26.6  5.7%) than the nonsuspecting subjects (Social
group: t(26) 3.2, p 0.005; Computer group: t(23) 2.2 p 0.05). The
interaction between group (Social/Computer) and exclusion (excluded/
included) for conformity levels was not significant, indicating that the
decrease in conformity was evident for suspecting subjects in both
groups (F(1,49) 0.3 p 0.6). Moreover, no significant activations were
found for the region of interest (ROI) identification contrast for ex-
cluded subjects (Manipulation trials  Credibility trials; Social and
Computer groups), even when using a relatively low threshold (0.001
uncorrected; k (cluster size) 10). No significant correlation was found
with the Change of Mind (COM) parameter in ROIs identified in main
text. BecauseN here is small, these null findings cannot be reliably inter-
preted.
Image acquisition and statistical analysis. All statistical tests reported
are two-sided. All post hoc tests are Bonferroni-corrected for multiple
comparisons, including correction for number of ROIs and reported p
values are multiplied to include this correction when appropriate. Vari-
ance is reported in SEM. Statistical analysis was performed using R (R
Project for Statistical Computing, RRID:nif-0000-10474), MATLAB
(2012 MathWorks; RRID:nlx_153890), and SPSS (version 21, IBM).
Image acquisition. Imaging was performed with a 3T Siemens Trio
Magnetom scanner at the Ascher Imaging Center in the Weizmann In-
stitute. All images were acquired using a 12-channel head matrix coil.
Three-dimensional T1-weighted anatomical scans were acquired with
high resolution 1 mm slice thickness (3D MP-RAGE sequence, TR 2300
ms, TE 2.98 ms, 1 mm3 voxels). For BOLD scanning T2*-weighted im-
ages were acquired using the following parameters: TR 2000 ms, TE 30
ms, flip angle 80°, 35 oblique slices without gap, 30° toward coronal plane
from AC PC, 3 3 4 mm voxel size covering the whole cerebrum.
Image analysis. Statistical Parametric Mapping (SPM8; Wellcome
Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, London; http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.
uk/spm) was used to analyze the fMRI data. After discarding the first
threedummyvolumes, imageswere realigned to the first volume,unwarped,
normalized to a standard EPI template based on the MNI reference brain,
resampled to 2 mm 2 mm 2 mm voxels, and spatially smoothed with
an isotropic 8 mm full width at half-maximumGaussian kernel.
Reaction times (RTs).AnANOVA for RTwith condition type (Manip-
ulation/Credibility) and group (Social/Computer) as factors revealed no
significant interaction. These results suggest that RT differences cannot
be a sufficient explanation for our results. Notwithstanding, the duration
of each eventwas specified in the first-level analysis (Fleming et al., 2012).
ROI identification. All parameter estimates extracted from ROIs rep-
resent the average value across all voxels in the ROI.
1. Functional ROIs. To identify candidate regions participating in re-
covery from past influence, we constructed the general linear model
(GLM) detailed below and performed an unbiased whole-brain contrast
searching for regions where BOLD response was greater for all misinfor-
mation trials relative to all Credibility trials (Manipulation  Credibil-
ity) regardless of group membership (i.e., over both the Social and
Computer groups together; whole-brain Family Wise Error (FWE) cor-
rected; p  0.05; cluster size (k)  50). This resulted in five regions:
anterior-lateral prefrontal cortex (alPFC), bilateral inferior parietal cor-
tex (IPC), superior medial prefrontal cortex (smPFC), and superior lat-
eral prefrontal cortex (slPFC). These regions were used as ROIs to
constrain subsequent analyses that compared the extent of correction in the
Social group versus the Computer group. The ROI identification does not
bias later comparisonofSocial andComputergroups, as initial identification
is conducted over both groups in an unbiased manner (Kriegeskorte et al.,
2009). For completeness, we additionally report a parietal region that was
active in both groups.
GLMmodel for ROI identification (Test 3). For each participant, a time
series was created indicating the temporal position of the different trial
types convolved with the canonical hemodynamic response using a
random-effects GLM. The critical time window from question presenta-
tion to subject’s response was modeled into the following: (1) No-
Information condition trials, (2) Credibility condition trials, and (3)
Manipulation condition trials. An additional regressor was created for
the time window of the confidence rating phase. For the contrast ap-
proachmodel only (see Results), theManipulation conditionwas further
divided according to whether the subject gave correct/incorrect answers
in Test 2 and Test 3.
Given that Credibility questions are comprised of questions initially
answered correctly as well as questions initially answered incorrectly
(Test 1) whereas theManipulation questions are comprised only of ques-
tions initially answered correctly, we additionally performed the same
ROI selection analysis as above but included only Credibility questions
answered correctly in Test 1. This resulted in identification of the same
ROIs (excluding the left IPS, FWE 0.05). As an additional control, we
added confidence scores on Test 3 as a covariate modulating the time
between question presentation and subject’s response. This resulted in
identification of the same five ROIs as above (whole-brain corrected,
FWE 0.05 k 50).
2. Anatomically defined ROIs. The a priori anatomical ROIs (left
amygdala and left anterior hippocampus) were selected based on their
involvement at the time of social influence (Edelson et al., 2011) and
defined based on known anatomical landmarks according to the Ta-
lairach Daemon Atlas (Lancaster et al., 1997) using the SPMWFU Pick-
Atlas tool (Maldjian et al., 2003).
COM parametric analysis. The COM value representing the subject’s
COMduring the Correction phase was calculated for eachManipulation
trial in which confidence rating was available on both Test 2 and Test 3
(average number of events per subject  35  0.7) using the equation
below (see Results section for more information) as follows:
COM Test3  Confidence Test 3 Test2  Confidence Test 2
For correct answer   1; for incorrect answer    1
COM values were calculated for each participant per each event. For the
behavioral analysis (see Fig. 3), each participant’s COM values were av-
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eraged per condition (i.e., Manipulation, Credibility, No-Information)
and then compared across conditions and groups (i.e., Social vs Com-
puter). For the brain-imaging data, we created a regressor for each par-
ticipant with one COM value per each Manipulation trial, modulating
the BOLD signal from question presentation until response. The result-
ing parametric COM values were averaged per participant across voxels
in each ROI and then compared across groups (Social vs Computer).
This GLMwas identical to the one described above for ROI identification
except that, for increased statistical power, the three scanning sessions in
Test 3 were concatenated and three constant terms were included to
represent each session (see SPM manual; http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.
uk/spm/doc/spm8_manual.pdf). Parametric regressors were automati-
cally orthogonalized to main effect regressors (SPM8; Wellcome Trust
Centre for Neuroimaging, London; http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm).
Absolute confidence levels during Test 3 were controlled for by adding
these values as an additional regressor preceding the COM regressor in
the first-level SPM model. Adding or removing this covariate did not
significantly alter the results.More complexmodels of COMwith a larger
number of free parameters (up to 5 degree polynomial model) did not
significantly improve our model fit over a simple linear model.
Mediation analysis. We created a mediation model for each subject
linking past amygdala activation with subsequent COM (via activity in
mediator regions; hippocampus and alPFC) per event. Thus, a GLM had
to be constructed for which activation for each event during Test 2 and
Test 3 could be extracted in the three ROIs and those values then entered
into each subject’s mediation analysis. Mediation parameters were then
averaged across subjects. To that end, for each participant, a time series
was created indicating the temporal position of each trial (one GLMwas
constructed for Test 2 and one for Test 3). Data for individual trials were
convolved with the canonical hemodynamic response using a random
effects GLM. For this GLM, each event was treated as a regressor, a
technique used in a similar context (Charpentier et al., 2014) as well as in
multivariate, functional connectivity, andmediation studies (Rissman et
al., 2004; Atlas et al., 2010; Bonnici et al., 2012; Chadwick et al., 2012;
Mumford et al., 2012; Cisler et al., 2014). For Test 2, parameter estimates
were extracted from the left amygdala (lAmy) and left anterior hip-
pocampus (laH) anatomical ROIs for each event separately during the
Manipulation phase. The same analysis was done in the left alPFC ROI
for Test 3. These values, for each event, were fed into the mediation
model below. In comparison with previous imaging studies, creating
parameter estimates per event allowed us to improve the statistical power
of the mediation model that is limited by the typical amount of partici-
pants in imaging studies.
Mediation model. A mediation analysis was performed following the
modern mediation format (Wager et al., 2008; Atlas et al., 2010; Hayes,
2013). The regions participating in the model were the anatomically
defined left amygdala and left anterior hippocampus and the functionally
defined left alPFC (see Fig. 4A). Usingmultiple regressionmodels, we calcu-
latedwithin each subject the following regressionparameter estimates (viaR
programing software and PROSESS SPSS macro, Model 6; Hayes, 2013;
parameter estimate of interest marked in bold;  error term).
1. A relationship between amygdala (initial predictor) and anterior hip-
pocampus (first mediator) activations as follows: laH activation 
beta1.1 * lAmy activation	 .
2. A relationship between laH (second mediator) and LalPFC (sec-
ond mediator) when lAmy activation is included in the model as
follows: LalPFC activation  beta2.1 * laH activation 	 beta2.2 *
lAmy activation 	 .
3. A relationship between LalPFC (firstmediator) andCOM(behavioral
outcome) when both lAmy and laH activation are included in the
model as follows: COMbeta3.1 * LalPFC activation	 beta3.2 * laH
activation	 beta3.3 * lAmy activation	 .
4. Indirect effect of interest (amygdala influence on COM via the ante-
rior hippocampus and alPFC mediators). For each subject, the indi-
rect effect of interest is defined as the multiplication product of the
aforementioned parameter estimates of interest (i.e., points 1 until 3)
(Wager et al., 2008; Hayes, 2013).
5. Total and direct effects. As defined by Hayes, 2013, the total effect is
the relationship between the amygdala (initial predictor) and COM
(outcome) before controlling for the mediators (COM  beta4.1 *
lAmy 	 ). The direct effect is defined as the relationship between
amygdala (initial predictor) and COM (outcome) after discounting
the variance explained by the mediation (Hayes, 2013).
All parameter values were then taken to a group level analysis. To make
minimumassumptions on the distribution of regression products, group
level analyses were conducted using a nonparametric Wilcoxon signed-
rank test, and the resulting z and p values were reported (Howell, 1997).
The use of a parametric test resulted in the same findings. To maintain
reference to older mediation models, we additionally performed a Sobel
test to determine whether the addition of the indirect pathway signifi-
cantly reduced the direct pathway.
Results
To examine whether and how people correct their beliefs follow-
ingmisleading social influence, it was critical to first demonstrate
that participants were indeed influenced by the false information.
Indeed, when presented with unanimous incorrect judgments of
co-observers (SocialManipulation trials, Test 2; Fig. 1Ci), partic-
Figure 1. Experimental outline.A, Subjects viewed a film in groups of five and subsequently
performed three memory tests individually. B, Test 1 assessed the participants’ initial memory
and confidence. C, In the Manipulation phase (Test 2), either Social or inanimate (Computer)
influence was induced. D, In the Correction phase (Test 3), the influence was removed and
recovery was examined. The Manipulation phase (C) had three different experimental condi-
tions: (1) theManipulation condition, inwhich all co-observers’ answerswere incorrect; (2) the
No-Information condition, inwhich the letter Xwas displayed instead of co-observers’ answers;
and (3) the Credibility condition, in which variable patterns of co-observers’ answers were
displayed. Imaging data reported correspond to the Correction phase scanning session (D), in
which each question and possible answers were presented for 1.5 s. Subsequently, a font color
change indicated that the participants could respond. Finally, confidence ratingswere provided
on 66% of the trials.
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ipants followed the false opinion of the majority in 68.3% of the
trials (aswe have previously reported in Edelson et al., 2011). This
was despite providing accurate confident responses to the same
questions during Test 1 (see Materials and Methods). Such con-
version to erroneous judgments was not explained by simple for-
getting because the conversion rates in this condition were
significantly greater than when participants were not presented
with answers of co-observers at all (Fig. 1Cii; mean conversion
rate of No-Information condition  15.5%; significantly lower
thanSocialManipulationcondition; t(19)16.9;p10

5; here and
subsequently,pvalues areBonferroni-corrected),orwhenpresented
with accurate/mixed responses of co-observers (Fig. 1Ciii; mean
conversionrateofCredibility condition11.8%; significantly lower
than Social Manipulation condition, t(19)  19.7; p 10

5). Fur-
thermore, error rates were greater when unanimous false informa-
tion was delivered by humans rather than computers (Computer
group Manipulation condition  52.7%; significantly lower than
SocialManipulation condition, t(38) 2.7; p 0.05). Entering con-
version rates into a 2 3 ANOVA with group (Social/Computer)
and condition (Manipulation/No-Information/Credibility) as fac-
tors revealed a significant interaction between group and condition,
as well as a main effect for condition and group (respectively:
F(2,76) 5.8; F(2,76) 207.3; F(1,38) 4.9; p 0.05). These results
indicate that participants altered their responses to conform to
the erroneous judgments of others (Edelson et al., 2011). The
current work focuses on how participants corrected these errors
once they learned they were misguided.
Correcting for past social influence: behavioral manifestation
When participants learned they were misguided, they corrected
past errors on 61% of the error trials that were due to Social
Manipulation (equal to 40.4% of all Social Manipulation trials)
and 59% of error trials due to the Computer Manipulation
(31.6%of all trials in this condition). This was not due to random
fluctuations in judgment because these numbers were signifi-
cantly lower on Credibility and No-Information trials (t(19) 
12.6 and t(19) 14.5 respectively; p 10

5).
To quantify the extent to which a belief is altered, it is impor-
tant to take into account not only the change in judgment but also
changes to the confidence in that judgment. Successful recovery
is possible because we maintain a representation of the original
correct information, even after the creation of a new competing
erroneous representation (Lewandowsky et al., 2012). Such
competing representations can be continually compared and in-
terchanged depending on the evidence supporting each represen-
tation (Vickers, 1970; Bogacz et al., 2006; Vlaev et al., 2011; De
Martino et al., 2013), which in turn can lead to change of mind
(Resulaj et al., 2009). Discrediting social influence, in this con-
text, introduces new evidence that can shift the balance toward
the original correct representation. Prominent neural computa-
tional models (such as drift diffusion models) postulate that, in
making a selection between two competing options, the brain
accumulates noisy evidence supporting each option until one
option reaches a threshold (Vickers, 1970; Bogacz et al., 2006;
Resulaj et al., 2009; Vlaev et al., 2011; De Martino et al., 2013).
Confidence in the selection then represents, at the point of
choice, the strength of support for one option compared with the
alternative (De Martino et al., 2013). As illustrated in Figure 2,
shifting from a low confidence erroneous judgment (Xi) to a low
confidence correct judgment (Xj; case I) represents less of a
change than shifting to a high confidence correct judgment (Xk;
case II). Furthermore, a subject may maintain the same answer
but alter his/her confidence in that answer. For example, onemay
have lower confidence in an incorrect answer after misinforma-
tion is discredited (i.e., case III; move from Xa to Xi), revealing a
change in the strength of the judgment.Or a subjectmay stickwith a
correct answer in the face of social influence but have enhanced
confidence in this correct answer after learning that the other partic-
ipants’ false answers were not credible (i.e., case IV; move from Xj
to Xk).
We will refer to the axis in Figure 2 above, spanning between
incorrect and correct answers, as the COM axis. For each subject,
we measured the amount of change on each trial for which con-
fidence ratings were available from Test 2 (whenmisinformation
was presented) to Test 3 (whenmisinformation was discredited).
Change is measured toward the direction of the correct answer
using the following equation:
COM Test3 Confidence Test 3 Test2 Confidence Test 2
For correct answer  1; for incorrect answer   1
We found that in the Social Manipulation condition COM was
significant (Fig. 3; mean COM value 36.7; significantly greater
than zero t(19)  10.8; p  10

5) and significantly larger than
COM values for the Credibility condition (mean COM value

0.9; t(19)  11.2; p  10

5) and the No-Information condition
(mean COM value 0.51; t(19)  12.2; p  10

5). COM values
tended to be larger in the Social Manipulation condition than in
the Computer Manipulation condition (mean COM value 28.3;
t(38) 1.8; trend for significance; p 0.08). This is to be expected,
Figure 2. COM flowchart model illustration, spanning from an incorrect answer with high
confidence to a correct answer with high confidence. According to the model, a larger shift on
this axis after influence is removed corresponds to a larger COM.
Figure 3. Behavioral manifestation of reversal. COM experimental results. The parameter
representing the change in confidence toward the correct answer between the Manipulation
phase (Test 2) and Correction phase (Test 3), for Manipulation, No-Information, and Credibility
events. *p 10
5.
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as misinformation delivered by humans had more of an initial
influence than misinformation delivered by computers. Indeed,
when controlling for the initial change in confidence that resulted
from learning the opinion of others (i.e., confidence in Test 2
relative to confidence in Test 1), this effect was no longer signif-
icant; (t(38) 1.3; p 0.2; all other comparisons remain signifi-
cant p  10
5). Together, these behavioral results suggest that
recovery from previoulsy induced errors is relatively robust, al-
though not complete, and manifests as restoration of both judg-
ment and confidence.
Correcting past influence: brain mechanisms
Functional brain imaging analysis proceeded through the follow-
ing steps (detailed in the sections below) to identify a model by
which past social influence is corrected. (1) First, we identified
regions showing significant activation (Test 3; Fig. 1D) related to
past presentation of unanimous false information, whether social
or inanimate. Frontal and parietal regions emerged. (2) Then, we
examined whether activity in any of these regions is specifically
related to correction of past social influence. Here, we identified
the alPFC. (3) Finally, usingmediation analysis, we examined the
relationship between activity in the left amygdala and left anterior
hippocampus during social influence and subsequent COM ac-
tivity in the left alPFCduring correction. Amodel of correction of
past social influence is then proposed.
Identifying activity related to unanimous past misleading infor-
mation. By definition, correction of misinformation necessitates
prior exposure to false information. Thus, brain regions that are
important for correction should bemore engaged during trials in
which strong consensus of misleading information was previ-
ously present relative to trials in which it was not. To that end, we
first identified brain regions where activity was greater (Test 3;
Fig. 1D) for events in which subjects were previously presented
with unanimous false information (Manipulation trials) relative
to events in which information was either accurate or mixed
(Credibility trials). This contrast was conducted across all sub-
jects regardless of whether they were in the Social or Computer
groups (FWE whole-brain corrected; p 0.05; k (cluster size)
50). Significant effects were observed in five regions: The left
anterior–lateral prefrontal cortex (LalPFC; peak at 
34, 56, 2
(MNI); k 74; Brodmann area [BA] 10), bilateral inferior pari-
etal cortex (IPC; BA 40; 48,
56, 46; k 265;
56,
58, 44; k
70) the right superiormedial (BA 6; 4, 34, 40; k 197) and lateral
prefrontal cortex (BA 9; 46, 26, 36; k 249) (Fig. 4A; Table 1; for
additional contrasts, see also Table 2).
Identifying activity related to correction of past influence (COM)
in the Social versus Computer group. The regions above were
found to be engaged during trials that were previously manipu-
lated relative to trials that were in the Credibility condition, re-
gardless of whether they were in the Social or Computer groups.
We then asked whether activity in these regions specifically sig-
naled a COM due to recovery from past social influence. Thus,
the analysis conducted in step 1 is independent from the analysis
conducted in step 2 (Kriegeskorte et al., 2009) but constrains it in
a meaningful way.
COM values were entered as a parametric regressor modulat-
ing the time period from question presentation until partici-
pants’ response to Manipulation questions in the Correction
phase on a trial by trial basis (Test 3). For each participant, the
parametric estimates averaged across all voxels, in each of the
above functional ROIs, were then extracted. Unbiased statistical
significance tests (Kriegeskorte et al., 2009) were performed on
the comparison of the Social and Computer groups.We find that
these parametric betas in the left alPFC were significantly greater
than zero in the Social group (t(19) 4.3; p 0.001), but not in
the Computer group (t(19)  
0.8; p  0.43). Importantly, the
effect of the former was significantly greater than the latter (t(38)
2.8; p 0.05; Figure 4B).
Given that social influence on participants was greater than
nonsocial influence, when comparing the BOLD signal related to
correction, we controlled for these initial differences by adding
both the magnitude of initial conformity and the change in the
initial confidence after misinformation was introduced (i.e., the
difference between Test 1 and Test 2 confidence) as covariates in
the second-level analysis. The fMRI results remained significant;
alPFC activity is more closely related to COM in the Social group
than Computer group after controlling for initial influence
[F(3,36) 5.6; p 0.05)]. These results indicate that activity in the
left alPFCwasmore likely to be related to correction of past social
influence than correction of nonsocial influence and did not
merely reflect the strength of initial influence.
For completeness, we also report that left IPC activation cor-
relatedwith theCOMinboth the Social (t(19) 3.5; p 0.05) and
Computer (t(19) 3.8; p 0.05) groups (direct comparison be-
tween groups t(38)  0.3; p  0.74; Figure 4B). No other ROIs
showed a significant difference between the Social andComputer
groups or a significant effect for either group separately [p 0.3;
except for the lateral PFCROI, which demonstrated a trend in the
Social group that did not survive correction formultiple compar-
isons (t(19) 2.3; p 0.1)].
Figure 4. Left alPFC and left IPC are involved in the COM process (Test 3). A, BOLD response
during Correction phase (Test 3) was greater for trials in which consensus misleading informa-
tionwas previously presented (Manipulation trials) versuswhen it was not (Credibility trials) in
the alPFC, the bilateral inferior parietal cortex, and the superior medial and lateral prefrontal
cortex (whole-brain FEW-corrected: p 0.05, k 50 over both Social and Computer groups).
B, Parametric beta estimates relating COMwith BOLD response in the left alPFC and left IPC for
the Social group (black) and the Computer group (gray). *p0.01. Reported coordinates are in
MNI space.
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It is of note that the more refined COMmodel fitted the brain
data better than a standard contrast approach, which compares
trials inwhich subjects successfully corrected past social influence
versus trials in which they failed to do so. Specifically, the COM
model values were significantly greater than the simple contrast
model betas for left alPFC (t(19) 2.6; p 0.05).
These results suggest that activity in the left alPFC is related to
recovery from social influence. We next characterized the brain’s
processing, going from activity during initial social influence to
subsequent correction via the left alPFC.
Characterizing a model for correction of past social influence
(COM). Correction of past social influence is likely dependent
not only on processes that occur after low credibility is revealed
but also on processes that occurredwhen the erroneous influence
was introduced in the first place. We previously reported that
heightened (left) amygdala-anterior hippocampal connectivity
during socialmanipulation (Manipulation phase, Test 2; Fig. 1C)
predicted a long-lasting effect of the erroneous social informa-
tion on the subjects’ memory (i.e., long-term errors in memory)
(Edelson et al., 2011). We thus hypothesized that amygdala acti-
vation during the time of social influence may alter memory rep-
resentations, rendering subsequent engagement of left alPFC
correction mechanisms less likely. In this case, amygdala influ-
ence on COMwould involve a two-step process. First, during the
time of social influence, amygdala activity would affect hip-
pocampal mnemonic representations. These changes will in turn
be related to subsequent left alPFCmediation of COMduring the
Correction phase. To test this hypothesis, we conducted a medi-
ation analysis (Atlas et al., 2010; Hayes, 2013,Wager et al., 2008),
following the steps ofmodern revisedmediation approaches, that
included activation in left amygdala (Test 2), left anterior hip-
pocampus (Test 2), and left alPFC (Test 3) as predictors of COM.
We first extracted left amygdala and left anterior hippocampal
activity (averaged over all voxels in these anatomically defined
regions) during the time subjectswere first exposed to false informa-
tion (i.e., Test 2, Fig. 1C) for each specific trial. We then performed
the same calculation for the left alPFC region during recovery (Test
3). Next, using linear regression models, we calculated the weights
for each path per subject (Fig. 5).
Left amygdala activity during initial exposure to the opinion
of others was inversely related to the subjects’ subsequent ten-
dency to change their minds when it was revealed that those
opinions were fabricated [referred to in mediation analysis ter-
minology (Hayes, 2013) as the Total effect
11.4; z (19) 2.1;
p  0.05; all parameter estimates are unstandardized]. Impor-
tantly, this relationship was at least partially mediated by an in-
direct effect of the left anterior hippocampus during exposure to
the opinions of others and alPFC activity during the time of cor-
rection. (parameter estimate of indirect effect of interest
2.5;
z (19)
2.4; p 0.05; adding the indirect pathway significantly
reduced the direct effect of the amygdala on COM parameter
estimate  
5.3; z (19)  
0.8; p  0.46; Sobel test p  0.05).
The model showed that left amygdala activity correlated with left
hippocampal activity during exposure to social influence (pa-
rameter estimate  0.53; z (19)  3.9; p  0.05) which was
inversely related to left alPFC activation during correction (pa-
rameter estimate
0.44; z (19)
2.8; p 0.05), whichwas in
turn significantly related to COM (parameter estimate  4.5; z
Table 1. ROI selection analysisa
Contrast Region MNI
t
value
p value (after
FWE whole-brain
correction) Cluster size
Manipulation Credibility (Social and Computer groups) Right inferior parietal cortex (BA 40) 48,
56, 46 7.5 3 10
4 265
FWE
Superior medial prefrontal cortex (BA 8) 4, 34, 40 7.1 7 10
4 197
FWE
alPFC (BA 10) 
34, 56, 2 6.8 0.002 74
FWE
Superior lateral prefrontal cortex (BA 9) 46, 26, 36 6.7 0.003 249
FWE
Left inferior parietal cortex (BA 40) 
56,
58, 44 6.6 0.003 72
FWE
aRegions more active for Manipulation versus Credibility regardless of group. Minimum cluster size 50.
Table 2. Manipulation versus Credibility for Social and Computer groups separatelya,b
Contrast Region MNI t value p value (cluster extent) Cluster size
Manipulation Credibility (Social group only) IPC (BA 40, BA 39) 48,
56, 46; 6.2 8 10
6 1010

56,
58, 44 5.3 9 10
5 680
14,
54, 34 6.1 0.008 274
Inferior frontal gyrus (BA 47, BA 45) 30, 24,
10 5.2 4 10
5 781
56, 24, 2 5.0 0.02 194
Lateral prefrontal cortex (BA 6, BA 9) 46, 24, 36 6.0 2 10
5 876

40, 14, 56 4.7 0.01 254
alPFC (BA 10) 
36, 56, 2 5.9 0.002 399
Medial frontal cortex (BA 8) 6, 34, 40 5.4 6 10
7 1396
Manipulation credibility (Computer group only) Occipital cortex, cuneus (BA 17) 
12,
94,
2 5.2 0.03 262
Medial frontal cortex (BA 8) 4, 34, 42 4.8 0.0001 795
IPC (BA 40) 42,
50, 44 4.5 0.03 245
alPFC (BA 10) 
30, 54, 2 4.2 0.04 210
Manipulation Credibility (Social Computer; or Social Computer) No significant clusters
aFDR cluster extent correction0.05, cluster defining threshold 0.001 uncorrected.
bTesting the additional regions found in Table 2 (excluding the aIPFC and IPS) for COM did not result in significant correlations ( p 0.2).
7750 • J. Neurosci., June 4, 2014 • 34(23):7744–7753 Edelson et al. • Brain Substrates of Recovery fromMisleading Influence
(19) 3.0; p 0.05). Adding the hippocampus as a predictor in
the regression model significantly increased the explained vari-
ance in COM scores (R2 adjusted formodel complexity 0.19 vs
0.24; t(19)  3.8; p  0.05), indicating that the hippocampus
played a role in the indirect pathway. These results indicate that
the indirect pathway of interest explains a significant part of the
relationship between amygdala activity in Test 2 and COM in
Test 3. For completeness, we conducted the same mediation
model in the Computer group. Themediationwas not significant
in this group (p 0.4). This is to be expected as activity neither in
the amygdala nor in the alPFC was related to COM in the Com-
puter group.
Testing other models. For completeness, we tested whether al-
PFC activation in the mediationmodel could be substituted with
activation of the other ROIs identified in Figure 4 (smPFC,
dlPFC, and IPS).Wedid not find this to be the case, as the indirect
effects were nonsignificant (p  0.4), even for the left IPS in
which activity correlated with COM in Test 3.
We also tested whether medial temporal lobe activation dur-
ing the time of social influence correction (i.e., Test 3 rather than
Test 2)mediatedCOMvia alPFC activity. Using the left amygdala
and anterior hippocampus activation values from the Correction
phase (Test 3 rather than Test 2 as in the firstmodel) did not yield
a significant effect between amygdala activity in Test 3 and COM
values or a significant mediation (p  0.3). This result suggests
that socially inducedmnemonic alterations, mediated by theme-
dial temporal lobe, may have already occurred at the stage of
initial exposure to social influence rather than in the Correction
phase. Thus, our results do not imply or necessitate a direct link
betweenmedial temporal lobe and alPFC.We also note that other
regions may play a role in the process. Our model does not nec-
essarily suggest that the regions identified are the sole regions
involved; rather, we suggest a function for these regions in this
process.
Discussion
The human social environment is dynamic andmandates flexible
mechanisms that enable us both to learn from others and to
reverse such learning when that influence is no longer valid
(Humphrey, 1976; Byrne and Whiten, 1989; Adolphs, 1999;
Dunbar, 2003;Olsson and Phelps, 2007; Campbell-Meiklejohn et
al., 2010; Zaki et al., 2011; Engelmann and Hein, 2013; Haun et
al., 2013). The current study describes a brain model underlying
this ability.
We first demonstrate that left alPFC activity reflected whether
the evidence shift was sufficient to induce an adjustment in judg-
ment. Our mediation analysis suggests an interaction between
socially induced falsememory encoding and the subsequent abil-
ity to change one’s mind. We then describe how this complex
process may unfold over two time points (Fig. 5). Specifically, we
suggest that amygdala activity during the time of initial social
influence affects the hippocampal-dependent memory system,
presumably altering mnemonic representations, which in turn
are related to restricted subsequent prefrontal correction mech-
anisms when influence is lifted. It is possible that amygdala activ-
ity leads to strongly encoded false memories that dominate the
original representations. This in turn may restrict the possibility
of recovery. These findings illuminate the process bywhich errors
are, or fail to be, corrected and highlight how social influence
restricts subsequent correction, even when that influence is later
discredited.
We found that alPFC activity wasmore tightly correlated with
correction of past social influence than nonsocial influence, even
after controlling for the initial size of influence. Our results tie
together past findings in primates and humans demonstrating
that the alPFC (sometimes referred to as rostrolateral PFC, lateral
orbitofrontal cortex, frontopolar cortex, or ventrolateral PFC, all
with similar spatial coordinates, e.g., Clark et al., 2004; Mendel-
sohn et al., 2008; Bunge et al., 2009; Boorman et al., 2011; Sakaki
et al., 2011; Badre et al., 2012) possesses the necessary capabilities
to partake of restorative processes and represent the value of
switching to a counterfactual or alternative choice (Cabeza and
Nyberg, 1997; Ramnani and Owen, 2004; Koechlin and Hyafil,
2007; Mendelsohn et al., 2008; Bunge et al., 2009; Rushworth et
al., 2011; Sakaki et al., 2011; Badre et al., 2012).
Our findings suggest that the alPFC tracks a subjective change
of mind and may improve selection and updating of competing
items by monitoring the change in evidence supporting the indi-
viduals’ initially selected option versus the option endorsed by
the group. Exceeding a threshold of alPFC activation may be
related to a change in behavioral judgment subserving successful
recovery from past influence. The function of alPFC is especially
important when environmental demands rapidly change and
mandate an adjustment of behavior (Rogers et al., 2000; Krin-
gelbach and Rolls, 2003; Clark et al., 2004; Morris and Dolan,
2004; Elliott and Deakin, 2005; Remijnse et al., 2005; Badre et al.,
2012).
The alPFC is involved in general control mechanisms (Christ-
off and Gabrieli, 2000; Ramnani and Owen, 2004; Elliott and
Deakin, 2005; Gilbert et al., 2006; Koechlin and Hyafil, 2007;
Bunge et al., 2009; Badre et al., 2012; Ruff et al., 2013), including
mnemonic control (Lepage et al., 2000; Mendelsohn et al., 2008;
Sakaki et al., 2011), such as reality (Johnson and Raye, 1981;
Figure 5. Sequentialmodel for correction of past social influence.Mediation results suggest
that amygdala-related restriction of correction is mediated via hippocampal and left alPFC
activity (indirect pathway of interest). The arrows indicate that the separate components of the
indirect pathway are significant. After taking into account all indirect effects, the direct effect of
the amygdala on COM is no longer significant. The total effect represents the summation of all
possible indirect and direct pathways. Values represent unstandardizedparameter estimates
for each path. *p 0.05. Dashed line indicates correlation over different time periods and thus
may be mediated by additional factors. Red and green arrows indicate a negative and positive
correlation, respectively.
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Johnson et al., 1993) and sourcemonitoring (Thompson-Schill et
al., 1997; Wagner et al., 2004), as well as the ability to evaluate
one’s own cognitive operations (Fleming et al., 2010, 2012) and
to process internally versus externally generated information
(Christoff and Gabrieli, 2000; Gilbert et al., 2006). Thus, the gen-
eral function of this region may be preferentially engaged de-
pending on social contextual factors (Kringelbach and Rolls,
2003; David et al., 2006; Spitzer et al., 2007; Mitchell et al., 2009;
Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2010; Raposo et al., 2011; Boorman
et al., 2013; Ruff et al., 2013).
Challenges in the social environment are assumed to exert
important selective pressures in the evolution of the hominid
brain, particularly frontal-dependent faculties (Adolphs, 1999;
Dunbar, 2003; Haun et al., 2013). The social environment can be
highly dynamic, mandating that individuals not retain overly
rigid representations and beliefs. The ability to change one’s
mindwhen the social environment changes is probably one of the
crucial processes for our survival (Humphrey, 1976; Byrne and
Whiten, 1989; Elliott andDeakin, 2005). Thus, studying recovery
from social influencemay present an advantageous way of study-
ing recovery mechanisms from powerful past influences. The
current study demonstrates how the human brain may achieve
this flexibility. Whereas long-term distortion resulting from the
influence of others is mediated by medial–temporal activity
(Edelson et al., 2011; Deuker et al., 2013), we show here that
reversing these effects to recover an original veridical belief is
mediated by prefrontal activity. Importantly, we suggest that the
final outcome is related to both systems, as restoration abilities in
the alPFC may be restricted by past amygdala’s modulation of
hippocampal-dependent memory system. The evolution of these
mechanisms may have helped humans and other social animals
by counterbalancing an adaptive tendency to conform with a
useful degree of plasticity within the social milieu.
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